Southland Corp v. Keating , 465 U.S.1 (1984), is a United States Supreme Court decision on arbitration. It was originally brought by a 7-Eleven franchise in a California state court, accusing breach of contract by the parent company then the chain. Southland pointed to the arbitration clause in their franchise agreement and said it required the dispute to be settled in that way; the franchisee cites the state franchise law that cancels any clause in the agreement requiring the franchisee to waive their rights under the law. The 7-2 majority states that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is applied to contracts that are held under state law.
Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger wrote for the majority that it was clearly the intent of Congress in conveying the FAA to encourage the widest possible use of arbitration, that it enforced "a national policy that supports arbitration". Judge Sandra Day O'Connor disagrees, along with William Rehnquist, on the grounds that the FAA legislative history strongly suggests it is intended to apply only to contracts that are implemented under federal law. In later years, Clarence Thomas will make his argument the basis of a series of disagreements from cases concerning the application of the FAA to state law, even in those cases where O'Connor went with the majority quoting stare decisis .
The decision was a turning point in the use of arbitration in American contract law, when followed by another decision limiting the authority of the state to govern the arbitration. This has been described as "perhaps the most controversial case in the history of the Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence." Its legal basis has been examined and debated, and some critics have found that the history of FAA legislation is directly opposed to court detention. An even scholar has found the decision as an unconstitutional offense against state power over their own courts. The clause of prebinding arbitration shall become widespread, especially in credit card agreements and other consumer services. Arbitrator advocates show their success in reducing the heavily charged courts, while consumer advocates allege that arbitration proceedings are biased against large corporations and to consumers, many of which are much poorer and legally unsophisticated. They will join to call for him to be overthrown (unsuccessfully) in later cases by 20 state prosecutors.
Video Southland Corp. v. Keating
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The plaintiffs, all 7-Eleven franchises, file an individual lawsuit at the California High Court by picking up Southland with fraud, misinterpretation, breach of contract, fiduciary duty violation and breach of disclosure requirements required in the California Franchise Investment Act (CFIL) between 1975 and 1977. Their actions are consolidated with others put forward by Keating in Alameda County seeking class certification for all franchisees. Southland seeks to force arbitration under a franchise agreement. The High Court granted the request except for the CFIL claim, citing Section 31512 of the law, in which the contractual language binding the franchisee to the exclusion of the rights granted is void. It does not see it as against the FAA, and does not rule out a motion for class certification.
The country's appellate court overturned the decision, read the arbitration clause to request arbitration of all claims under contract, including those under the CFIL. If the CFIL language does create exceptions, it is superseded by federal law and thus can not be enforced. This leads the courts to begin hearing the classroom certification movement.
The plaintiffs appealed to the California Supreme Court. It decides to support them, see CFIL as requiring adjudication of all claims brought under it, and not against the FAA. Again, the case was submitted to court with instructions to begin hearing the classroom certification movement.
Existing arbitrage law
New York City traders, who had embraced arbitration as an alternative dispute settlement method in the early 20th century, persuaded Congress to ratify the FAA in 1925. Until then many courts were wary of the process, sometimes even refusing to accept it as binding. After they persuaded New York to legislate the laws of the state that allow arbitration proceedings to be considered binding on both parties, the law became the model for the FAA.
For the first few decades after it was ratified, the FAA is understood to apply to contracts that are carried out under federal law, in particular those concerned. The Supreme Court first considered the case relating to it at Wilko v. Swan , where 7-2 the majority find that the anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 cancel the arbitration clause where securities fraud is alleged. The issue of conflict with state law emerged several years later at Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. Where a court, with only Harold Hitz Burton disagree, has refused to allow the federal court to decide whether the arbitration clause only applies because one of the parties in the dispute has moved to another state than the country where the contract was originally implemented. In 1959 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that the FAA apply to state court actions as well, when deciding that a dispute is not just an execution, but the contract itself could be an arbitration.
In the case of Cat Prima 1967, the Court has opened the door for wider arbitrage use when adopting the principle of separateness, imposing arbitration from claims that the contract has been fraudulently induced. It states that any challenge to the validity of the contract with the arbitration clause must be heard by the arbitrator first, unless the challenge is in the arbitration clause itself. This creates legal fiction that there are two separate contracts.
The term before hearing the Southland appeal, court 6-3 has been, at Memorial Hospital Moses H. Cone v. Mercury Construction Corp. , reinforcing an appeal decision that overturned the district court's postponement of federal action. to force arbitration pending disposition of parallel actions in state courts. The main problem in that case is the proper application of the Colorado River abstention doctrine and whether the lower court ruling can be appealed. In a glance, the opinion notes that "... a state court, just like a federal court, is required to grant a litigation delay under Ã, § 3 of the Arbitration Act... Congress can hardly mean that the agreement to do arbitration can be upheld against a party that seeks to prosecute a dispute that can be tried in federal court, but not against a person who sues in the same dispute in a state court. "
Maps Southland Corp. v. Keating
Before the Trial
In an oral argument at the end of 1983 Mark Spooner refers to the dictum in the previous Cone of the term stating that the FAA is applied to the state. He held firm despite being challenged to read this. "[I] Part 2 was read otherwise... [t] the hat will lead to a shopping forum and will destroy the predictability of inter-state commercial transactions which is very important", he told the judges. "What Congress can give, but countries can not take over what Congress has approved and can be enacted in federal law."
"[Q] Aside from encouraging forum spending, the conclusion if the California Supreme Court decision is enforced," replied John Wells, "Southland's solicited decision is one that will encourage forum spending." He notes that in securities laws enforced at Wilko , Congress not only includes anti-waiver provisions but encourages states to pass parallel laws, many of which include their own anti-waiver provisions. If the Southland position is held in force for the law, "[t] hat will result in the same claim that comes to federal court which is non-negotiable but if brought to state court under state securities laws it will be necessary to become an arbitration. "He also noted that the contract only grants arbitrator jurisdiction over an instant dispute between the parties and does not specifically grant arbitrator powers to uphold honors under the CFIL. "Arbitration is not a good place to uphold the important rights set out in complex laws."
Decision
The court delayed deciding whether it has jurisdiction while considering the merits of the case. In April 1984, he passed a 7-2 decision. Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger wrote for the majority, with John Paul Stevens agreeing in part and disagreeing partly. Differences Sandra Day O'Connor joins William Rehnquist, who has written a disagreement on Cone.
Majority
"Contracts for arbitration can not be avoided by allowing one party to abandon the contract and take the path to court," Burger writes, explaining why the Court chose not to allow advanced country litigation before deciding on its core issues. "For us to delay the review of the judicial decisions of countries that refuse enforcement of contracts to arbitrate until litigation the state court has done its duty will defeat the core purpose of the contract for arbitration." However, the Court has no jurisdiction to decide on class certification questions at that time in action.
The next section of that opinion addresses the application of the FAA to the state. "In enacting Ã, § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declares a national policy that supports arbitration and withdraws the powers of states to request a judicial forum for the settlement of claims approved by contracting parties to be settled by arbitration," Burger. There are only two legal exceptions: that it is only valid written maritime contracts or contracts "prove transactions involving commerce", and that arbitration agreements can only be canceled "on a legal or in-equity basis for the lifting of any contract". Cone have found FAA to be a substantive law that Congress has the power to pass under the Trade Clause. In that case, "[we] expressly state what is implicit in Prime Cat that that that the substantive law made by the law can be applied in state courts and federal."
The third section deals with legislative history in response to O'Connor's heavy dependence on him in his dissent. "Although [it] is not without ambiguity, there are strong indications that Congress has something more than making arbitration agreements only applicable in federal courts." If the enforcement of the arbitration agreement, which by common law has long been skeptical, is only a matter in federal court, he reasoned, Congress would likely take little action. "To limit the scope of the Law for arbitration seeking to be enacted in federal courts will thwart what we believe Congress is meant to be the appropriate wide applicability in scope to meet the big issues that Congress is addressing."
If, as O'Connor says, the FAA is merely procedural law, why does Congress restrict it to maritime and interstate transactions? "Therefore we see the requirement of 'involving trade' in §§2, not as an unexplained limitation on the strength of federal courts, but as a necessary qualification to the law intended to be applied in state and federal courts." O'Connor's interpretation will lead to a shopping forum, Burger writes:
We do not want to associate with Congress anyway, in drawing the comprehensive strength of the Trade Clause, to create the right to enforce an arbitration contract and not yet make the right dependence for its enforcement on a particular forum in which it is affirmed. And because the tremendous proportion of all civil litigation in this country is in state courts, we can not trust Congress intended to limit the Arbitration Act to disputes that are only subject to the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Such an interpretation would derail the congress's intention to put "an arbitration agreement... on the same footing as any other contract, wherever it is."
In creating the substantive rules applicable in both state and federal courts, Congress intends to close the legislative efforts of the state to undermine enforcement of arbitration agreements. We are of the opinion that Ã,§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Act violates the Supremacy Clause.
Stevens Deal
"I was convinced that the development of intervention in the law forced the conclusion that the Court had reached," Stevens began. "I remain annoyed by one aspect of the case that does not seem to bother my colleagues." He refers to a majority opinion that, if the case is brought to federal court as a case of diversity analogous to Prima Cat , an arbitration clause will be enforceable.
Because the FAA allows arbitration agreements to be abrogated based on the same principle that applies to contracts in general, but does not specifically mention what principles might apply, "it would appear that the judiciary should regulate the boundaries as a federal federal legal matter". Such a federal general law would likely use state precedents and contract law, as indeed lower federal courts do so when evaluating the question of whether the contract has been properly established in the challenge to the arbitration clause. For that reason, he believes public policy decisions about arbitration and enforcement are entitled to more latitude than the majority gives. A past Supreme Court, at Paramount Famous Lasky Corp v. United States , annulled arbitration agreements among those who consider it serves to withhold trade.
We shall not refuse to use an independent judgment on the conditions under which the arbitration agreement, which is generally applicable under the Act, may be considered not inconsistent with public policy simply because the source of substantive law agreed by the arbitration agreement is the State, rather than the Federal Government. I found no evidence that Congress intended such a double standard to be applied, and I would not lightly impose such intentions on the 1925 Congress that authorized the Arbitration Act.
Dissent
O'Connor begins by noting that the language of the majority United States "court" decides the decision not to determine which court, and that the following two sections specifically refer to the federal court. "Today, the Court took silent faces ç§2 as a license to declare that the state as well as federal courts should apply Ã,§2", he writes. "The Court's decision was driven by an understandable desire to encourage the use of arbitration, but it completely failed to recognize the apparent congressional intentions underlying the FAA." Congress intended to require federal, non-state, courts to honor arbitration agreements. "
He traces the misread majority to the first Erie Railroad v. Tompkins and its ownership that the court can not create substantive law. Then, at Bernhardt, the court found that, at least in case of diversity, state law controlled the arbitration clause. Prima Paint, in his view, solved the concern that Bernhardt made the FAA constitutional issue in such cases, but carefully avoided the question of whether it could be applied to state courts as well.
"The case of today is the first in which this Court has a chance to determine whether the FAA applies to state trials", O'Connor continued, calling the dictum in Cone completely unnecessary to hold it ". He broke majority opinion into three conclusions, criticizing each one in turn. Firstly, that §2 FAA creates a substantive right to be imposed by state courts, calling it "undoubtedly wrong as a matter of legal construction". Secondly, that a given substantive right can not be the basis for applying a federal jurisdiction "appears to be an attempt to limit the damage done by the first", and the final requirement that a state court follow a procedure similar to that described later on. sections specifically mentioning federal courts are "unnecessary and unwise".
"People rarely find legislative history as unambiguous as the FAA," he wrote. His sponsor in the House has assured his colleagues that the only purpose of the bill is to make arbitral agreements workable; the report of the committee and the American Bar Association (ABA) brief above it repeatedly describes it as purely procedural. The concept has convinced two subcommittees that Congress will not "[direct] its own tribunal... [to] violate the province or prerogative of America... There is no disposition therefore by using the Federal bludgeon to force the individual State into submission unwilling to arbitration enforcement. "
The hearing transcripts and other notes from the FAA section also state clearly that Congress relies on its power to organize federal courts rather than trade clauses, he points out. The DPR's subcommittee report explicitly states that the FAA is procedural and not substantive. "Obviously, the power that comes from Congress' Art III control over the jurisdiction of federal courts will not, by fancy flights, allow Congress to control proceedings in state courts", O'Connor concluded. "These things can not be considered 'ambiguities' in legislative history." One sentence quoted directly by Burger for a majority referring to "contracts involving commerce" is clearly solved by other statements in legislative history, he added.
Later readings have followed this intention. Both the Prime Cat and the Cone , he reminds the majority, have been involved in litigation in federal court. "Justice Black will surely be surprised to find the majority opinion or difference of opinion in Prima Cat cited by the Court today, for both." His opinion that holding the FAA in force in the process of the state "will jeer at the intentions of the drafters of the Law" has not been contested in the majority opinion of Judge Fortas in the case, he said.
O'Connor also objected to the majority insistence that state courts strictly follow federal procedures in enforcing the FAA. "Assuming, on the contrary, that §2 does create a federal right that must be enforced by state courts, the state courts should still be allowed, at least in the first instance, to set up their own procedures to enforce the right.Unfortunately, the Court seems to direct that the arbitration clause the issue here has to be specifically enforced, apparently no other enforcement is permitted. "Even if he agrees that the FAA is applied in state courts, he says, he will still disagree on this provision only.
The majority of concern about forum shopping is misplaced, as it has been handled by the creation of previous actions and interpretations. "Because the FAA makes federal courts equally accessible to both parties in dispute, no forum spending will be possible even if we give the FAA a construction that is faithful to congressional intentions." The only problem that is not resolved in the original law, the question of which law controls the diversity of actions, has been resolved by Bernhardt , he writes.
"Today's decision is not in line with congressional intentions, it is not necessary, and, given its FAA predecessor and the contraction of federal power intervention, it can not be explained," he concluded. "Although arbitration is a viable alternative to litigation, today's practice in judicial revisionism goes too far."
Aftermath and legacy
After being handed over to the High Court where the cases originated, the court judge ruled all class issues. The case continues to arbitration, in which the arbitrators refuse to review the judge's verdict. It was then settled out of court.
With the question of contract arbitrability under the law of the country being resolved, the arbitration clause begins to appear in many of the adhesion contracts offered for employment and consumer services such as credit. This has been described as the "consumerization" of arbitration. Many arbitration mandated before the dispute even emerged.
Since Southland and subsequent decisions state that the state court has no basis other than standard defense to contract validity to remain arbitration, the states begin to organize arbitration proceedings and agreements themselves, primarily through the so-called model law The Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA) which in 2010 was adopted by 13 states and the District of Columbia, with three states considering it. California now requires that an arbitrator disclose any potential conflicts of interest to a party before an arbitration, and New Mexico adds to the RUAA version a "disabling civil disputes clause" enabling arbitration agreements to be canceled in consumer, credit, employment and tenant contracts. Some of them have been challenged in court. One case occurred, Green Tree Financial Inc. v. Bazzle, where the South Carolina court has ordered arbitration on the basis of the class, reached the Supreme Court but the majority did not consider the question, but considered whether the contract allowed class arbitration to begin (Rehnquist argued in his dissenting opinion that the FAA did precede).
Advanced jurisprudence
In the years after Southland , the arbitration case continued to come to the Supreme Court of state and federal courts. In accordance with Burger's "national policy", it decides many of those who support compelling arbitration. The 1985 ruling that required Chrysler-Plymouth San Juan-area dealers to mediate antitrust claims in Tokyo was strongly criticized, and ultimately led to the Franchise Franchise Franchise Justice Act of 2001, which bans contracts between car manufacturers and dealers from including pre-clauses very good arbitration. This is the first time Congress has enforced an exception to the FAA.
The California Court produced two more cases that addressed the issue of preemption. Perry v. Thomas , in 1987, invalidated a state law allowing the collection of salaries to proceed regardless of the arbitration agreement. O'Connor and Stevens disagreed. Both reiterate their previous opinions and include others, O'Connor cites Stevens' belief that countries should be entitled to restrict some arbitration as a matter of public policy as reasons he would uphold California law even if he agrees the FAA applies to state-level action part. In Information Science Volt v. Stanford University, the Court unanimously refused to force arbitration under the FAA because the contract between the parties agreed that it would be governed by California law, which limits the arbitration issue. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson
The state judges and many commentators agreed with O'Connor that Southland had been wrongly decided, and sought an opportunity to cancel it. In the early 1990s, they appeared to have cases that also involved a group of people fighting the local branch of a multistate company, where state legislation seemed to make the issue non-negotiable. The action was brought by Alabama homeowners against Terminix, the former owner's exterminator, after they found a newly purchased house full of termites with termites regardless of previous owner's assurance that it was free of them.
Terminix attempts to keep a lawsuit by citing the arbitration clause in its contract with the previous owner, who is also the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Alabama ruled that Southland did not apply because it was a pure local transaction between the homeowner and the local branch of Terminix. After the certiorari was granted, 20 state prosecutors filed an amici file asking the court to take this opportunity to cancel Southland.
When the decision is revealed, such as Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. V. Dobson , Court 7-2 not only refuses to do so, it extends the reach of the FAA further, to include transactions such as one being reviewed, as they affect interstate commerce. Judge Stephen Breyer, writing for the majority, reads the use of "involving" to be equivalent to "influencing", he said showing congressional intentions for the law to have the widest possible reach. Since nothing has changed since Southland , they refuse to cancel it.
O'Connor voted for the majority this time, writing in a separate agreement that although his opinion has not changed since he Southland disagrees a decade earlier, staring at decisis dictates that he upholds. the case is because too many contracts will be canceled if canceled. Two judges were appointed to the interim Court, Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, disagree. Scalia, noting that he has joined the majority at Perry and Volt that is dependent on Southland , says that however he feels that the case has been decided by wrong and, with the FAA preemption question before the Court again, he chose to cancel it, not looking at staring at decisis as a barrier. "I will not in the future disagree from the decision that is based on Southland.I will, however, be ready to join the other four judges to the exclusion of it, because Southland will not become more true from time to time, [and] The future of legislation does not seem to be affected by its existence. "
Thomas Thomas's dissent
Thomas proposed a longer disagreement criticizing the majority opinion in Southland and expanding O'Connor's differences in the case. "In my view, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not apply in state courts," he began. Like Stevens at Perry, he recorded 35 years between the first section of action and advice (in Robert Lawrence ) applied in state courts as well. "The explanation for the postponement is simple: The law enacted by Congress actually applies only in federal courts."
He reviewed the action section, noting sources, including the interpretation of the New York Appeals Court by Benjamin Cardozo of the modeled FAA state law, describing it as purely procedural. An initial legal review article reads it as not considered applicable to a state court, though for that reason it can. "Indeed, to assess the reported cases, it appears that no state court is even required to enforce legislation for many years after the passage of the FAA."
The federal court, he said, has refused to apply state arbitration laws in federal cases that the FAA does not apply, since it is not considered substantive. "In short, the state arbitration law sets the rules for state courts, and the FAA sets the rules for federal courts". The arbitration clause, Thomas wrote, arguably election forum, is considered procedural rather than substantive. "And if the terms of the contract solely deal with the matter of judicial procedure, one might conclude that the question of whether and how it would be enforced also relates to the procedure."
Like O'Connor, he reads the FAA text carefully and does not find any implied authority over the state. "[T] he FAA treats the arbitration only as one way of resolving disputes within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, it makes clear that the violation of a closed arbitration agreement does not by itself provide an independent basis for that jurisdiction. forced to admit this... "The majority, according to Thomas, offers only one real response: his argument that Congress will extend it to all contracts if it is meant for the FAA to be procedural. He offered the possibility that Congress might instead believe "there is no federal interest in doing so unless interstate or maritime trade is involved." This conclusion is much more sensible... "
Along with Stevens and Scalia, he echoes O'Connor's view that even if the FAA is clearly applied to state courts, it does not follow that it implements the same procedural requirements on them. Both the law and the law of the case in Alabama are hostile to a predetermined arbitration agreement, and he feels the Court must submit to the public policy objectives of the legislature and the courts of the state. Provisions prohibiting the special enforcement of such arbitration agreements seem to provide a sufficient basis for staying, he wrote.
He joined Scalia in rejecting the attention of O'Connor stare decisis .
I see no reason to think that the cost to rule out Southland is so high. Of course there is no dependency interest involved in such cases today, where the application of the FAA is not in the contemplation of the parties at the time of the contract. In many other cases, moreover, the parties will only abide by their arbitration agreements, either on the theory that they must fulfill their promises or on the theory that arbitration is the cheapest and best way to resolve their disputes. In a fair amount of the remaining cases, the party seeking to enforce the arbitration agreement will be able to enter the federal court, where the FAA will apply. And even if access to federal courts is unlikely (since Ã,§2 does not create an independent basis for the federal-jurisdiction of the question), many cases will arise in States where the law itself is largely parallel to the FAA.
Even if the stare decisis applies, Thomas concludes, it will not include the procedural requirements of the act because the Court has never formally declared that the things applied to the state as well.
Scalia has since joined many of the majority who enforce an arbitration clause under contracts under state law, in one case writing a statement that an arbitrator should be the first to decide whether a contract is illegal under state law. Thomas was the only person who disagreed in the case, and in another California case in the following year where the majority decided that state laws providing administrative dispute resolution were also excluded by the FAA. The difference of opinion in such cases consists of a paragraph referring to the dissent of Terminix and its offspring.
Analysis and comments
O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas are not the only critics of Southland and who take Congress intention in passing the FAA. It has been called "extraordinary to hold a preemption that overtly ignores legislative intentions," "unbelievably dishonest" and "very misleading".
Margaret Moses, an international arbitration scholar at Loyola University's Chicago School of Law, has traced Southland to a series of misreads in his predecessor's ruling that made the original FAA "unrecognizable" in its current legal incarnation. This starts with a dilemma created by the Erie Railroad twin precedent, which rejects Swift v. Tyson by holding that federal courts must apply the state law in which it sits in various cases, and Guaranty Trust Co. v. York , which clarifies the Erie Railroad with the "result-determinative" requirement that if federal law would result in a different outcome of state law, state law should be applied. Bernhardt has raised this question, but the Court avoids it by stating that employment contracts, even cross-state, are not interstate trading for FAA purposes, while noting that the determinant's results will produce the same results.
Prima Paint forced the Court to face the problem directly, when a New Jersey company rejected a Maryland company's request for a false claim to be alleged. If they apply a determinative result test, according to Moses, the judge will make the FAA ineffective on the intended purpose. The court could have ruled the purely procedural FAA following recent decisions, Hanna v. Plumer , but are concerned about Congress making rules affecting contracts, traditionally especially a problem for the state. So he chose to follow the Second Circuit decision at Robert Lawrence by relying on the Dormant Commerce Clause as the basis for FAA readings. This, he wrote, contradicts the legislative history of the law, which repeatedly refers to it as purely procedural action. "In Prima Cat , the Court achieved pragmatic results but used unfavorable methods to get there."
In addition, he argues, the court failed to limit the scope of the decision. It set the stage for Judge William J. Brennan, Jr. to affirm at dicta in both the Cone both that the FAA makes arbitration as national policy and it is applied to the state court. , without good support for the statement. Again, the history of the act's laws indicates that it is only intended to allow the federal court to allow arbitration. "The so-called policies that support arbitration seem to be something created by the courts of all the fabric," Moses said. It may arise from a more explicit statement of a national policy supporting the arbitration of laborers, cited by the Court at Mitsubishi Motors later. "
As a result of Cone dicta, appellees in Southland specifies that FAA is applied to the state and does not debate its points either briefly or orally. The majority, continued Musa, repeated the mistake of Prima Cat in basing FAA in the Trade Clause. Burger's interpretation of the language that confines closed contracts to maritime or commercial agreements is not just speculative, it is wrong. The language has been added in the amendment offered by Senator Thomas J. Walsh, who intends to limit the scope of the action, not extend it, so it can not be applied to employment contracts and insurance. The single reference to the Trade Clause as empowering Congress is at the end of the memo prepared by the FAA drafter, intended, Moses believes, as a "backward position" should FAA be found outside the sphere of congressional power to govern federal courts.
David Schwartz of Wisconsin Law School, author of amicus filed in Bazzle , has stated that the Southland range gives the FAA unconstitutional even if it is clearly intended to apply to state courts "and no one notices." He joined different judges and other critics in finding it "properly seen as procedural when viewed from any angle." For Schwartz, it is also a restructuring of state courts mandated by the federal government. "The right constitutional solution is not to change the neutral government of a neutral state government, but to ensure that a federal forum is available to hear the claim (and requires states to reject federal claims for lack of appropriate jurisdiction)."
Some commentators defended the decision. Prominent among them is Christopher Drahozal of Kansas, who argues that legislative history does support its application to state courts as a secondary goal. "Most statements in legislative history depend on commentators to criticize Southland ownership," he wrote, "declaring that the FAA applies in federal courts, not just in federal courts." While he is also critical of the way Burger makes his arguments, and agrees there is ambiguity in the notes, he believes the Court reads them correctly.
Schwartz says Drahozal's analysis is "thought" but not true. Moses says that while Drahozal's argument has some points, "he can continue to swim upstream at this point without many scientific companies". He believes he relies too heavily on statements in a drafter memo that says the second goal is to make arbitrage agreements that can be implemented in federal courts, which ignore many explicit statements that are not intended for it.
See also
- List of US Supreme Court cases, volume 465
References
Further reading
- Drahozal, Christopher R. (2002). "In Defense of Southland : Re-Checking Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act". Notre Dame's Legal Review . 78 (1): 101-170. SSRNÃ, 373041 .
- Dunham, Kenneth F. (2010). " Southland Corp v. Keating Revisited: Twenty Five Years on Which Direction?" (PDF) . Law Review Charleston . 4 (2): 331-369. Ã,
External links
- 465 U.S. 1 (1984)
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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