Tax protesters in the United States have put forward a number of arguments stating that the federal income tax assessment and collection violates the laws passed by the United States Congress and signed into law by the President. Such arguments generally claim that a particular law fails to make tax obligations, that the law does not impose income tax on wages or other types of income claimed by tax shippers, or that the provisions of the law granted to free protesters tax of the obligation to pay.
These legal arguments are distinguished from, although they relate to conspiracy, constitutional, administrative and general arguments. The legal argument presupposes that Congress has the constitutional power to assess taxes on income, but that Congress has failed to levy taxes by enacting certain laws.
Video Tax protester statutory arguments
Definisi istilah "state" dan "termasuk"
In light of the arguments that the Federal income tax should not apply to citizens or residents in fifty states, some taxpayers argue about the meaning of the terms "state" and "including".
Taxpayer argument
One of the arguments is that the definitions of "state" and "United States" in most subparts and common definitions in the Internal Revenue Code are what are changed by other sections of the code as "state 'specific definitions", where the definition of the law includes the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and several other areas, without mentioning 50 states. Based on this argument, the definition of "state" in the Code in general, or within a subset of a particular code of ethics, refers only to territory, or belongs to the federal government, or the District of Columbia. Alaska and Hawaii were once included in the "special" definition of a "state" until each is removed from a common definition by the Alaska Omnibus Act and the Hawaii Omnibus Act when they are each received at the Union.
Under the following tax protector argument, the term "state" is used in the international sense of "nation" or "sovereign". The argument is that this meaning refers to the foreign status of each state to every other state including the federal state, under private international law. Based on this argument, all court opinions about the problems of foreign countries with each other (as well as with federal states and property) have supported this concept, and have distinguished between foreign meanings by using the term private international law > and public international law . Under this argument, the latter term relates to the authority of 50 states delegated to the United States government to represent American interests outside the United States, grouping all persons bound by the Constitution of the United States as one body, relative to those who are not bound. , such as French or English. Based on this argument, the term "private international law" signifies the peculiarities of sovereign states, or countries, of the United States system with each other, within the system.
Taxpayers argue that the significance of the definition applies when the term "state" is a reference to a federal state as defined in sub-section or in general, then when "state" is referenced in another definition (such as "employee") in a relevant place, it has the same meaning. There are two parts of Code that define "employees" in all Internal Revenue Codes and both are found in the Title section where "country" is governed by this "special" definition. Tax protesters argue that each section defines the term "employee" as limited to a person working within or at the workplace of a country, or who is a company official, while the court has ruled that the term "employee" is not limited to those persons. The definition of "wage" is the reward earned by "employee." Tax protesters argue that the normal income tax is a tax on wages and some laws that require things such as the filing of returns are only required by employees.
Tax protesters argue that there is no conflicting definition of "state" or "United States" for this interpretation in Title 26 of the United States Code (Internal Revenue Code) - that the second of two of these terms is defined as " 50 states, "the term is localized to subsections. Under this argument, in the two subparts defining "state" as the 50 states, there is no mention of the District of Columbia or any territory in the definition.
The general definition of the Internal Revenue Code of the term "country" in section 7701 is as follows:
The term "State" shall be construed to include the District of Columbia, where such construction is required to implement the provisions of this title.
Some tax protesters have argued that, in connection with the phrase "to include the District of Columbia," the term "including" should generally have any meaning of exclusivity listed if the list was made in a certain way. In such a situation, in which the definition of "State" is an example, the argument says that nothing is missing from the list included with what is included.
Other sections of the Internal Revenue Code include the District of Columbia and the United States in response to the definition of "Country," or geographically, "United States" (26 C.F.R Ã,§ 31.3132 (e) -1)
The general definition of the Internal Income Code terms "include" and "include" are as follows:
The terms "include" and "include" when used in the definitions contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things other than that in the sense of the term specified.
Some tax protesters argue that in the case of 1911 Montello Salt Co. v. Utah , the Supreme Court states that the term "include" in general can be exchanged with "also" but not necessarily, and can sometimes have a meaning of exclusivity. The case of Montello Salt is not a Federal tax case, and there is no problem involving the meaning of the term "country" or "including" or "including" as used in the Internal Revenue Code presented or terminated. by Court. The word "tax" is not found in the decision text of Montello Salt .
Court ruling on the definition of the Internal Revenue Code "country" and " including "
In the 1959 tax case, the United States Supreme Court declared that the term "included" in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.Ã,§§§7701) was an expansionary term, not a term of exclusivity. The subsection (c) of section 7701 provides:
The terms "include" and "include" when used in the definitions contained in this title shall not be deemed to exclude other things other than that in the sense of the term specified.
Similarly, in the case of the United States v. Condo , the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit states:
[taxpayer] other tax theories are equally reckless. Its affirmation that 26 U.S.C.Ã,§ 7343 applies only to business entities and their employees ignore the word "include" in the law that describes the class of responsible persons. The word "includes" extends, not the limit, the definition of "person" to these entities.
No federal court supports the argument that the term "country" as used in the Internal Revenue Code excludes fifty states or that the term "country" means simply "District of Columbia". The argument that the term "country" as used in federal income tax law means only the District of Columbia and the territory is specifically rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Sort at United States v. Ward . Similarly, in the case of Nieman v. Commissioner , the taxpayer argues that "Congress excludes 50 States from the definition of" United States ", for the purposes of 26 U.S.C., Subtitle A." The United States Tax Court rejected the argument, stating:
The applicant tries to argue with an absurd proposition, essentially that the State of Illinois is not part of the United States. The hope is that he will find some technical semantics that will make him exempt from Federal income tax, which is generally applicable to all citizens and residents of the US. Suffice it to say, we have not found the support of any of the applicants who are authorized to quote for his position that he is not subject to Federal income tax on income earned in Illinois.
See also United States v. Bell (the taxpayer argument - that the term "United States" includes "only territories and properties such as 'Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Guam and American Samoa'... but not adjacent to 48 countries, Hawaii and Alaska "by arguing that the term" include "is the term" limitation "- rejected). See also Commissioner Friesen v. (argument of taxpayers - that Nebraska is "without" the United States and that as a resident of Nebraska, the "foreign taxpayer for foreign Federal jurisdictions" and therefore not subject to taxable income - is denied).
The argument that the United States does not include all or part of the physical realm of fifty states, and variations of this argument, has been formally identified as a recklessly legally federal tax return for fiscal $ 5,000 tax purposes imposed under the Internal Revenue Code section 6702 (a).
Arguments of private sector employees
Arguments related to the meaning of the words "include" and "include" are the arguments that for Federal tax purposes, the term "employee" under section Internal Revenue Code 3401 (c) excludes private sector employees. The court uniformly rejects this argument. The text of section 3401 (c), which deals only with the requirements of employee deductions and not with the employee's requirements to report the Internal Revenue Section of 61 compensation for personal services (whether called wages, salaries, or other terms), is as follows:
For the purpose of this chapter, the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision, or a District of Columbia, or any agent or mediation of one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes a company officer.
In Sullivan v. United States , taxpayer Grant W. Sullivan believes that he does not receive "wages" and not "employees" under the Internal Revenue Code 3401 (c). The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided against Sullivan, stating:
To the extent that Sullivan argued that he did not receive "wages" in 1983 because he was not an "employee" in the sense of 26 U.S.C. Ã,§3401 (c), the argument is meaningless. Section 3401 (c), which relates to income tax deduction, indicates that the definition of "employee" includes officials and government officials, elected officials, and company officials. The law is not intended to limit the deductions to those listed therein.
In United States v. Ferguson , taxpayer, Joy Ferguson argues that he is not an "employee" under section 3401 (c), and that he therefore can not have "wages." The court decided to oppose it, stating:
The essence of the dispute before the court is Ferguson's assertion that he is not an "employee" as defined by Ã,§3401 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and therefore does not get "wages." [footnote omitted] Thus, he argues that Form 1040 and Form 4862 accurately report his salary as zero. As noted by the government, Ferguson's interpretation of §3401 (c) has been considered and rejected many times by many courts. This court would agree with an extraordinary precedent on this issue, Ferguson's argument that he is not an employee as defined by Ã,§3401 (c) is reckless.
In Luesse v. United States , taxpayers Chell C. Luesse of St. Louis Park, Minnesota, argues that he does not receive "wages" because he is not an "employee" under section 3401 (c). The court ruled against Luesse.
In Richey v. Stewart , the court states:
Another familiar argument from Mr. Richey [taxpayer] is that he is not an employee under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, citing Section 3401 (c), which states that the term "employee" includes government employees. What is Mr. Richey misguided in his reading of the law is the inclusional nature of the language. This code does not exclude all others from taxation that are not government employees.
In United States v. Charboneau , the court stated:
[... ] Ms Charboneau argues that the definition of the Code of "wage income" and "self-employment income" only includes income derived from individuals working for the federal government, or whose work involves the "performance of public office functions." Charboneau has never worked for the federal government or any state during the tax year in question, he claims that the IRS can not make tax assessments against it.
This absurd argument is denied by the simple language of the Internal Revenue Code itself. For example, 26 U.S.C. Ã, §3401 defines wages as "all remuneration (in addition to fees paid to public officials) for services performed by an employee to his employer...." 26 U.S.C. Ã,§3401 (a) (emphasis added). The law then proceeds by setting exceptions to this broad definition of wages in certain categories of private employment, such as in the field of agricultural and domestic services, newspaper delivery, clergy, and for wages issued by individuals employed by employers "other than America States or existing institutions "within Puerto Rico or belonging to the United States. Nothing in the law restricts the "wages" to revenues that come from the public. [footnote removed]
Ms. Charboneau, however, focuses on Ã,§3401 (c), which states that:
the term "employee" includes an officer, employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision, or a District of Columbia, or any body or instrument of one or more of the foregoing. The term "employee" also includes a company officer.
26 U.S.C. Ã,§3401 (c). In spite of the last sentence of this provision, which clearly states that officials of private companies are considered employees for the purpose of determining wages, it is clear that in the context of this law that the word "include" is a term of enlargement, not of limitation, and of reference to public officials and employees certain not intended to exclude others. See also Sims v. United States, 359 US 108, 112-13 (1959) (concluding that similar provisions at 26 USC Ã,§§6331 dealing with wage and wage fees do not exclude private citizens' salaries); Sullivan v. United States of America , 788 F.2d 813,815 ("[Section 3401 (c)] is not intended to limit the withholding to those listed therein"); United States v. Latham , 754 F.2d 747, 750 (7th Cir 1985) (the definition of the Internal Revenue Code "employee" in 26 USC Ã, §§3401 does not exclude personally hired wage earners); In addition, 26 U.S.C. Ã,§7701, which provides definitions of terms used throughout the Internal Revenue Code, states that "the terms 'include' and 'include' when used in the definitions contained in this title shall not be considered to exclude other things other than that in the sense of defined terms. "26 ASC Ã,§7701 (c).
In McCoy v. United States , the court stated:
McCoy argued that he did not have to pay taxes for 1996-98 because under Code Section 3401 he was not an "employee" whom he deemed to be defined as an employee or elected official or federal government. McCoy clearly misrepresented Article 3401 (c). The definition of "employee" includes private sector employees, federal government employees, and elected and appointed officials. The language of the Code is inclusive, not limited to the examples of people included.
Joseph Alan Fennell's argument - that the compensation he received in exchange for "non-federated federal private sector employment" was not taxable - rejected by the United States Tax Court. Fennell appealed against the disappearance of the Tax Court, but the US Court of Appeals for the Circuit District of Columbia ruled that Fennell's challenge was "reckless at the merits of every event." Similarly, in the United States v. Buras , the argument that taxpayers may be subject to federal income taxes only if they benefit from "extended privileges by government agencies" is ruled out unfounded. See also Olson v. United States and Nichols v. United States .
A $ 1,000 penalty under the Internal Revenue Code section 6673 was imposed by the US Tax Court on Patrick Michael Mooney for presenting frivolous arguments. The court rejected his argument that wages earned from private companies were not taxed. The court also rejected his argument that the term "employee" is limited to "someone performing a public office function."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that an argument by Robert S. Morse that his income was not subject to federal taxes because of his employment in the "private sector" was reckless, and that Morse was responsible for sanctions, under Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Procedure Appeal, for making a reckless argument.
Arguments of which only a few types of taxpayers (such as only Federal government employees, corporations, nonresident foreigners, residents of the District of Columbia, or residents of Federal territory) are subject to income taxes and labor taxes, and variations of this argument, having been formally identified as positions Federal tax returns are legally reckless for tax returns of $ 5,000 taxed under the Internal Revenue Code 6702 (a) section.
Maps Tax protester statutory arguments
Argument on legal obligations to pay tax
Some tax protesters argue that no law imposed a Federal income tax or required a refund, or that the government was obliged to show tax lawyers or tell the protesters why they were taxed, or that the government refused to disclose the law.
Internal Revenue Code as a law passed by Congress
The New York Times article on July 31, 2006, states that when filmmaker Aaron Russo requested an IRS spokesman for a law requiring payment of income tax on wages and provided links to various documents including the title 26 of the American Code United (Internal Revenue Code), Russo denies that title 26 is legal, argues that it only consists of "rules" of the IRS and has not been enacted by Congress.
Versions of the Internal Revenue Code issued as "title 26" of the United States Code are those referred to by the Office of the Legal Revision Adviser of the US House of Representatives as "non-positive law". This is one number; titles 2, 6-8, 12, 15, 16, 19-22, 24-27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 40-43, 45, 47, 48, and 50 are "non-positive laws". However, according to the United States Statute of the Great, the original version of the 1986 code is currently enforced by the US Congress of the Eighty-third Congress as the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, with the phrase "Be her endorsed by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America at Congress was collected. "The code was approved (signed into law) by President Dwight D. Eisenhower at 9:45 am Eastern Daylight, on Monday, August 16, 1954, and published as volume 68A of the United States Statute in the Great. Section 1 (a) (1) of the applicability states: "The provisions of this Act established under the heading 'Internal Revenue Title' may be referred to as the 'Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Part 1 (d) of the enactment entitled" Entry into Force Title of Internal Revenue Becoming a Law ", and the text of the Code follows, beginning with a valid Content List, Enforcement ends with the approval of the notation on page 929. Part 2 (a) of the Reform Act Act 1986 renames the Code from" 1954 " "1986" Code The Internal Revenue Code is also separately published as the 26th title of the United States Code.
Regarding the legal status of the US Statute at Large, 1 AS provides 112 (in part, with italics added):
The United States archivist must be compiled, edited, indexed and published, the United States Statute in the Large, which shall include all laws and concurrent resolutions adopted at every regular session of the Congress ; all proclamations by the President in serial numbers issued from the date of postponement of the regular session of the next Congress before; and also any amendments to the Constitution of the United States proposed or ratified in accordance with article V since that date, together with certificates of the United States Archivist issued in accordance with the provisions of section 106b of this title. [... ] The statute of the United States of America in the Great is legal evidence, concurrent resolution, treaties, international agreements other than agreements, proclamations by the President, and proposed or ratified amendments to the US Constitution in them. contained, in all US courts, several States, and Territories and narrow possessions of the United States .
In the case of Ryan v. Bilby , taxpayers, Dennis Ryan, have been convicted of failure to file tax returns. He therefore sued district court judges, prosecutors, defense lawyers, two judges, and IRS agents in the case. Ryan's demands were thrown out. He then appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which decided against Ryan and stated:
Ryan's main opinion about the appeal is that, since Congress never authorized Title 26 of the United States Code into positive law, the defendants violated their constitutional rights by trying to enforce it. [footnote removed] Thus, he concluded, the district court was mistaken by refusing his lawsuit. This contradiction makes no sense.
The failure of the congress to impose a title [United States Code] into positive law has only a verification significance and does not make the underlying imposition invalid or unenforceable. See 1 U. S. C. Ã,§204 (a) (1982) (the title text not authorized into positive law is only a prima facie proof of the law itself). Like it or not, the Internal Revenue Code is the law, and the defendants do not violate Ryan's right by enforcing it.
The Court of Appeal sentenced Mr. Tn. Ryan under 28 U.S.C. section 1912, in the form of ordering him to pay a double fee, for filing a reckless appeal.
Similarly, in Young v. Internal Revenue Service , the US District Court for the North District of Indiana states:
Plaintiff [taxpayer, Jerry L. Young] insists that the Internal Revenue Code does not apply to him. The basis of this claim is not easily found in the complaint. According to "the plaintiff's answer to the court at the request of the defendant," "This is the fact that the Internal Revenue Code is NOT a Positive Law that U. S. C. Title 26 NEVER be passed by Congress." (Emphasis in the original).
The only support the court can find for this argument among many submissions is the letter dated 7 May 1981 of the American Legal Division of the Congressional Research Service (plaintiff Exhibit 7). The letter does say that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 "is not authorized by Congress as the title of the US Code." But this does not support the plaintiff's argument that the Internal Revenue Code is not a positive law. First, the same letter, in the same sentence , states that "The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is a positive law..." Secondly, even though Congress does not ratify the Code as a title, it implements the Internal Revenue Code as a separate Code, see Law of 16 August 1954, Stat 68A. 1, which was later nominated as Title 26 by the House Judgment Committee under 1 U. S. C. Ã,§202 (a). Finally, even if Title 26 is not itself authorized to be a positive law, it does not mean that the law under that title is null and void. The laws listed in the current United States edition are prima facie evidence of US law. See 1 U. S. C. Ã,§204 (a). As the letter offered by the plaintiff indicates, "The court may request proof of the underlying law when the law is in the title of a code that has not been ratified into a positive law." In short, this court has the discretion to recognize the Internal Revenue Code as the applicable law, or to request proof of the underlying law.
Consistent with the policy, the court acknowledges that the Internal Revenue Code is a positive law applicable to disputes over whether a tax is owned by a person such as a plaintiff. The court refused to accept the plaintiff's position that the tax laws in the United States were a hoax designed by the IRS to violate the constitutional rights of US citizens. Quite simply, the court considers the plaintiff's position unreasonable.
Similarly, in the United States v. McLain , the US District Court for the District of Minnesota states:
[Taxpayer, Frances] McLain also argues that the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is the prime facie the legal evidence under which the Title <26 is based. Docket No. 163 at 4. McLain is wrong. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is subject to positive law in the form of separate codes and, as amended, is an authoritative statement of the law. 1 U.S.C. Ã,§ 204 (a) & amp; note; ch. 736, Stat 68A. 3, 3 (1954); Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (1986) (stating that the Internal Revenue Title adopted in 1954, as amended, may be referred to as the Internal Revenue Code 1986); Tax Analyst v. IRS, 214 F.3d 179, 182 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In addition, while McLain is technically correct in stating that Title 26 is only prima facie legal evidence, the difference is largely academic because the relevant sections of Title 26 identical to the relevant section of Internal Revenue Code .
Similarly, the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has rejected the argument that "the Internal Revenue Code has not been enacted into a 'positive law'".
Some taxpayers actually argue that the Internal Revenue Code itself says that the Code "has no legal effect." The court has rejected this argument as well, and has sentenced to make this argument.
The argument that the Internal Revenue Code is not a "law", the argument that the Internal Revenue Code is not a "positive law", the argument that it is not in the Internal Revenue Code that imposes the requirement to file a return or pay tax, and similar arguments has been identified as reckless arguments for $ 5,000 penalty for taking a reckless position on a tax return.
Specific Code Terms
Although the special law that imposes an income tax may be generally unknown to anyone other than a tax lawyer, certified public accountant, registered agent, and other tax specialist, the law exists. The Internal Revenue Code section 1 (26 USC Ã,§Ã, 1) (related to individuals, plantations and trusts) and 11 (26 USC Ã,§Ã,§) (related to the company) are examples of legislation that strictly enforce the income tax on "taxable income" (with part 1 (a), for example, expressly using the phrase "[t] here hereby imposed on taxable income [..]] "and article 11 stating:" The tax so charged shall be for each taxable year on the taxable income of each enterprise. "). The term "taxable income" is in turn defined in section 63 (26 U.S.C.Ã,§§§) with reference to "gross income" which in turn is defined in 26 U.S.C.Ã,§Ã, 61.
In Holywell Corp v. Smith, the United States Supreme Court (in the case of unanimous) declares legal significance 26 U.S.C.Ã,§Ã, 6151:
The Internal Revenue Code binds the obligation to pay federal income taxes to the duty to make income tax returns. See 26 U.S.C. 6151 (a) ('when the return of taxes is required... the person required to perform such a return must... pay such taxes').
Regarding the civil monetary penalty for failure to pay the tax on time, 26 U.S.C.Ã, 6651 (a) (2) states (in part):
In the case of failure--
[... ]
(2) to pay the amount shown on the tax on profits specified in paragraph (1) on or before the date specified for the payment of such tax (determined in respect of extension of payment period), unless it is shown that the failure is due to reasonable reasons and not due to intentional negligence, shall be added to the amount indicated as a tax on the return of 0.5 per cent of the amount of such tax if the failure is not more than 1 month, with an additional 0.5 per cent for each additional month or fraction thereof during the failure continues, not exceeding 25 percent in the aggregate [... ]
Regarding Federal income tax returns for unmarried individuals, 26 US. 6012 provides (in part):
Refunds with respect to income tax under subtitle A shall be made in the following manner: [... ]
(A) Every individual who owns for gross income a taxable year equal to or exceeds the amount of waiver, except that a refund is not required of an individual - Unlawned (dd>
(i) not determined by applying sections 7703), not the surviving spouse (as defined in section 2 (a)), not the head of the household (as defined in section 2 (b)) , and for the taxable year has gross income less than the total number of exceptions plus a reduction of the applicable basic standard for that individual... ]
Further provisions of section 6012 refers to the filing of tax returns for other individual taxpayers (for example, married persons filing joint returns, surviving spouses, heads of households, married persons applying for separate refunds) as well as to other entities such as corporations, estates , and trust. See also 26 U.S.C.Ã, Ã,§ 6011.
Monetary monetary penalties for failure of timely tax file returns (denominated as "additions" to taxes) are mentioned on 26 U.S.C.Ã, 6651 (a) (1). Under 26 USC 6061, with certain exceptions, exceptions, "any return [..] What must be done under the terms of law or internal revenue rules shall be signed in accordance with the form or rule prescribed by the Secretary "(emphasis added). Treasury regulations indicate that individual Federal income tax returns must be filed on "Form 1040," "Form 1040A," etc.
Criminal penalty for deliberate failure of a timely tax file return or pay tax is mentioned on 26 U.S.C.Ã,§Ã, 7203:
Any person required under this heading to pay any taxes or taxes deemed, or required by this title or by any regulation created under his or her authority to obtain a return, record, or provide any information that intentionally fails to pay tax or tax which is supposed to make such returns, keep the records, or provide such information, at the time or time required by law or regulation, shall, other than any other punishment provided by law, be guilty of minor crimes and, after his conviction, shall be fined more than $ 25,000 ($ 100,000 in the case of the company), or incarcerated for not more than 1 year, or both, together with the cost of prosecution [... ]
Di bawah 26 U.S.C.§ 7206:
Everyone who--
- (1) Declaration under the penalty of perjury
- Intentionally create and subscribe to any returns, statements or other documents, containing or verified by a written statement that it was made under the penalty of perjury, and which he does not believe is true and correct for any material; or
- (2) Help or help
- Inadvertently assisting or assisting, or establishing, advising, or suggesting preparations or presentations below, or in connection with any issues arising under, internal income law, returns, written statements, claims , or other document, which is false or false in any matter whatsoever, whether such fraud or fraud is committed with the consent or consent of the competent authority or requested to provide such return, statement, claim or document; or [... ]
- (A) Property hide
- Hides from any US officer or employee any property that includes the property of the taxpayer or any other person liable for taxes, or
- (B) Holding, falsifying, and destroying records
Accept, retain, destroy, mutilate, or falsify any books, documents or records, or make any false statements relating to the property or financial condition of the tax payer or other person in charge responsible for taxes;will be guilty of crime and, for his belief, will be fined no more than $ 100,000 ($ 500,000 in corporation cases), or incarcerate not more than 3 years, or both, together with the cost of prosecution.
See also 26 U.S.C.Ã, Ã,§ 7207 and 18 U.S.C.Ã, 1001.
Federal tax avoidance laws follow the language of legal provisions such as Part 1 (individual income tax law), with both laws using the word "subject":
Any person who deliberately attempts in any way to circumvent or defeat any tax imposed by this title or his payment, other than any other punishment granted by law, is guilty of a crime and, for his/her belief, shall be fined not more than $ 100,000 ($ 500,000 in the case of the company), or incarcerated for not more than 5 years, or both, together with the cost of prosecution.
The argument "show me the law"
Some tax protesters such as Edward Brown and tax-protection organizations like We the People Foundation have used the phrase "show me the law" to declare that the Internal Revenue Service refuses to disclose laws that impose legal obligations to propose Federal income taxes. refund or pay any Federal income taxes - and argue that no legislation enforces Federal income tax.
The official Internal Revenue Service website contains references to specific and legal parts of the code, including 26 U.S.C.Ã,  ± 6011 (the obligation to restore files in general); 26 U.S.C.Ã,  ± 6012 (obligation to file a special income tax refund); and 26 USC Ã,§ 6151 (obligation to pay tax at the time of return required to be filed) and 26 USCÃ, Ã, 61 (definition of gross income) and 26 USC Ã,§Ã, 6072 (time duty for file).
The 2007 manual for Form 1040, US Individual Income Tax Returns, on page 83, contains references to 26 U.S.C.Ã,  ± 6001 (relating to record keeping); 26 U.S.C.Ã,  ± 6011 (general archiving requirements); 26 U.S.C.Ã, 6012 (a) (the requirement for the filing of certain income tax returns); and 26 U.S.C.Ã,§Ã, 6109 (assignments to provide identification numbers).
The IRS website includes sections on taxpayer arguments with citations to laws (including 26 USCÃ, §6151 duty to pay taxes) and court decisions and pages with links to the entire Internal Revenue Code as published by the Legal Information Institute at Cornell University's Law School.
The related argument has been suggested that taxpayers may not be penalized for tax evasion unless the taxpayer knows that section 7201 is a specific part of the Internal Revenue Code that criminalizes the behavior. The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has dismissed this argument as "reckless," and has stated:
[... ] a person may be penalized for a tax breach only if he/she knows that the Code [Internal Earnings] requires him to pay. The jury was so instructed, and his verdict showed that he found, without a doubt, that Patridge [the taxpayer] knew he had to pay taxes on what he earned from his business. It is almost impossible to imagine otherwise: the foreign trust system and fictitious "lending" show that Patridge is trying to hide the income that he knows as taxes. Why else all this folderol? But Patridge, like many others who know what the law requires, can not say which provisions in the Code make taxable income and prevent evasion. To that end, many tax lawyers (and most judges) can not file a quote without glancing at a book. This memory shortage (perhaps, for Patridge, the avoidance of deliberate knowledge) prevents criminal punishment, [lawyer for Patridge] insists.
But why is this happening? No law says it; no opinion holds it. [... Section] 7201 only makes a "deliberate" tax criminal. A deliberate act for the purpose of tax law [... ] when the taxpayer knows what Code needs [,] but specifies to thwart the system. Knowledge of lawsuits does not depend on knowing the quote [,] more than the ability to watch programs on TV depends on knowing the frequency at which the signal is broadcast.
The argument that a person does not owe a federal income tax because the Internal Revenue Service has failed to identify federal tax laws have been rejected by the US Tax Court, and has been ordered to be reckless.
Require description of tax liability
A variation on the "show law" argument, "no law requires income tax" argument, and "IRS refuses to say what the law makes US citizens responsible for income tax" argument is the assumption that the IRS has an affirmative charge to respond to taxpayer demands answer why taxpayers have to pay income tax. This argument is based on taxpayer theories about both constitutional law and legislation, but the constitutional and legal arguments will be described together here for the purpose of presentation.
Some taxpayers claim the following language from court decisions at Schulz v. Internal Revenue Service (2005) means that the taxpayer has the appropriate process rights to demand a response from the IRS as to why he/she is subject to taxation:
As an attempt to seek enforcement through federal courts, IRS calls are not applicable to taxpayers, and no consequences may befall a taxpayer who refuses, ignores, or otherwise disobeys call the IRS until the call is received. backed by a federal court order..,. any individual subject [such as a court order] should be given a reasonable opportunity to comply and can not be considered insulting, arrested, detained or punished for refusing to comply with an original IRS call, regardless of taxpayer reason, or lacking reason to refuse it. "
Taxpayer Robert L. Schulz filed a motion in federal court to cancel an administrative call issued by the IRS seeking testimony and documents in connection with an IRS investigation. The court at Schulz did not rule out the possibility that the taxpayer had the right to ask the IRS to explain why he was taxed, and the matter was not brought to justice. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirms the discharge of the taxpayer due to the lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter as there is no actual case or controversy as required by Article III of the Constitution. The court reasoned that the call does not pose an injury threat to taxpayers, as the IRS has not yet begun a law enforcement process against it. In other words, the taxpayer is not entitled to a court order to cancel a letter of call until The IRS goes to court to demand that he comply with a call or otherwise face a sanction - something that the IRS has not yet completed. Once the IRS takes that action, the taxpayer will then have many opportunities to challenge the validity of the call.
The Court emphasized that the law requires the IRS to use the judicial process to punish a lack of compliance with administrative calls; the call is not upright. This is true for every government request where citizens are free to ignore requests until the government enforces law enforcement. The court judges only the true controversy. In the case of Schulz, the court leaves open the possibility that the IRS may decide to cancel the investigation and never enforce the call, or that the plaintiff may voluntarily comply with the request. Until the IRS takes the taxpayer to court, the injury is merely "hypothetical".
While there is disagreement about how "immediate" the injury must be before the taxpayer can get help from the court, this is separate from the obligation to timely lodge a tax return (imposed by law). The Schulz trial did not rule out that the IRS was asked to "explain" to the taxpayer why he should pay taxes, but instead that the taxpayer could not get a court order to cancel the summons until the first IRS went to court against him. In addition, the taxpayer is a challenging request for documents and testimonies for investigations (similar to challenging a subpoena or warrant), not demanding that the IRS explain to him why he is taxed. The court did not decide that the taxpayer did not have obligations to respond to the call until the IRS made the proceedings against the taxpayer. The court essentially ruled that the taxpayer could not be convicted for failing to comply until the taxpayer had violated a court order requiring compliance.
The next attempt by taxpayer Robert L. Schulz to get a court order to cancel the IRS "third party" call issued to an internet payment service known as PayPal was rejected by the Federal Court in June 2006.
In a separate case, Schulz and his We the People Foundation organization argue that it is unsuccessful that, under the First Amendment right of the people to petition the government for redress, the government must have an obligation to respond to taxpayers' requests for explanations why taxpayers are subject to income tax. On 8 May 2007, Schulz's argument was rejected by the US Court of Appeals for the Circuit District of Columbia at We the People Foundation, Inc. v. United States .
On August 9, 2007, the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York issued an order including the permanently banning orders of Schulz and We the People Foundation from (1) advising or instructing persons or entities not required to apply for federal tax returns or paying taxes federal; (2) sell or provide any material intended to enable the individual to stop or stop withholding or paying federal taxes; (3) instruct, advise or assist anyone to stop withholding or stop paying federal employment or income tax; and (4) deter or advise anyone to impede the inspection, collection, or other IRS process.
The argument "income tax is voluntary"
Some taxpayers argue that the filing of a Federal income tax return or tax payment is "voluntary" (in the sense of "not a legal obligation") based on the language in the text of many court cases, as follows: "Our taxation system is based on voluntary and payment assessments instead on distraint "(from the case of the US Supreme Court of Flora v. United States .)
The protesters cited documents which, they argued, emphasized the voluntary nature of the tax:
The taxpayer must be liable for taxes. Tax liability is a condition that precedes a request. Only demand payment, even repeatedly, does not cause obligation... For the condition of the precedent of obligations to be fulfilled, there must be a valid assessment, either voluntary by the taxpayer, or one that is procedurally appropriate, by the IRS. Since the state income tax system is based on voluntary assessment, rather than distraint, the Service may assess taxes only under certain circumstances and in accordance with appropriate procedures.
Our tax system is based on individual assessments and voluntary compliance.
The main task of the IRS is to collect taxes under a system of voluntary compliance.
Let's not forget the subtle nature of the voluntary compliance tax system...
Let me show you this now: Your income tax is 100 percent voluntary tax, and your drink tax is 100 percent tax imposed. Now, the situation is different like night and day.
At Flora , the Supreme Court ruled that the Federal District Court has no subject of jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit by taxpayers for Federal tax returns where the taxpayer has not paid the entire amount assessed (the rule, known as Flora full payment rule , does not apply to US Tax Court cases or bankruptcy cases). Taxpayers sometimes cite the language in cases like Flora because the presumption that the filing of tax returns and paying taxes is not legally required, namely that the filing of tax returns and payments is, in that sense, "voluntary".
In the case of Flora , the taxpayer does not argue, and the court does not decide that there is no legal obligation to file a Federal tax return or pay any related taxes. The Court's Decision on Flora is almost the opposite: the taxpayer is required to pay the full amount of taxes claimed by the IRS to be paid by the taxpayer before the court will hear a lawsuit by the taxpayer against the government to determine correct tax amount.
The language quoted from Flora refers to Federal income tax: "Our taxation system is based on voluntary assessments and payments, not on disinterest." The key words are "voluntary" and "unimportant". Like many legal terms, "voluntary" has more than one legal meaning. In the context of the quoted sentence, income tax is voluntary because the person who bears the tax economic burden is the person who is required to calculate the amount of taxes and file a related tax return. In this sense, the tax on the sale of a non-tax state is voluntary - that is, the purchaser of the product does not calculate the tax or file a related tax return. The shop where he purchased the product calculates the sales tax, collects the customer, collects tax from him at the time of sale, prepares and submits a monthly or quarterly sales tax return and sends the money back to the tax authority.
In Flora , the Court uses the word "voluntary" as opposed to the word "traitor." Distraint is a legal term used in various contexts. For example, distraint is used to refer to the actions of a landlord who hides the property of an existing tenant in the ownership of the landlord to secure the payment of the rent due. Property "held for ransom," in the sense, is said to be "pressed," or "depressed." The key connotation of the word "distraint" is that there is often the possession or possession of property to encourage the debtor to pay an obligation. Once the debt is paid, the property is released.
In contrast, the Internal Revenue Service does not seize property taxpayers every January to encourage taxpayers to file tax returns and pay taxes by April 15. The IRS relies on "voluntary" compliance because the term is used in this sense.
In a separate sense of the word "voluntary" in which some tax protesters use the term, the obligation to pay taxes and lodge a return is not voluntary - whether for income tax or sales tax. For example, the Internal Revenue Code is replete with laws that specifically enforce obligations to apply for returns and pay taxes, and impose civil and criminal penalties for deliberate failure to do so in a timely manner (see above). The difference is that in the case of income tax, the taxpayer filed a return, whereas in the case of sales tax, the seller (not the customer) filed a return.
Likewise, the word "judgment" has more than one tax law meaning. In the quotation from Flora the term "judgment" refers not to the mandatory assessment by the Internal Revenue Service under 26 USC Ã,§ 6201 and 26 USCç§6322 and other laws (that is, the official record of taxes on books and records of the US Treasury). This term is instead used in the sense in which the taxpayer himself "judges" or calculates his own tax in the process of preparing tax returns , before applying for a refund.
Similarly, the word "deficiency" has more than one technical meaning under the Internal Revenue Code: one type of "shortfall" for the purposes of 26 USC Ã,§Ã, 6211 relating to notices of law violations, US Tax Court cases, etc. (that is, usually, the excess amount claimed by the IRS is the correct tax on the number of taxpayers' claims is the correct tax - whether calculated regardless of how much tax has been paid) compared to other types of "deficiencies" for the purpose of case law under embezzlement taxes and other criminal laws (which means, in effect, the amount of unpaid taxes actually owes). The tax law, like all other areas of the law, is full of words like "volunteerism," "judgment," and "flaws" that have meanings that vary depending on the various legal contexts in which the terms are used.
In connection with the use of the term "voluntary," no court has ever ruled that there is no legal obligation under the Internal Revenue Code 1986 for the exact file Federal income tax refund or for timely paying Federal income tax.
Failure to refund tax
Another argument has been raised is the theory that federal income tax can not be assessed against a person who has not filed a federal income tax return. This argument is rejected in Carroll v. United States .
Formal tax assessment
Some tax protesters argue that taxes should be formally assessed (officially registered, under section 6203 of the Internal Revenue Code, in the books of the US Treasury Office) by the Internal Revenue Service before a federal tax liability can exist. No court supports this argument. Code Internal Revenue section 6151 (a) states that:
when the return of taxes is required under this title or rule, the person requested for such refund shall, without any judgment or notice and request from the Secretary of the Department of Finance or its delegate, pay the tax to the internal revenue officer by who the return is filed, and must pay the tax at the time and place specified for filing a refund [... ]
The argument that no taxes are payable unless the tax is first formally assessed by the IRS is specifically rejected by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which cites Section 6151 (a), in the United States of America v. Ellett , cites United States v. Daniel , United States v. Hogan , and United States v. Dack .
Likewise, under the US Bankruptcy Code, there is no requirement that federal taxes which are declared to be officially considered to be considered valid in bankruptcy. Indeed, until the enactment of the 1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act, section 362 (a) (6) the prohibition of appraisal without prior court approval applies to a valid pre-petition tax. Under the Act of 1994, the restriction was removed by amendment under section 362 (b) (9), which now stipulates that although the tax authorities may assess a valid pre-petition tax without prior approval of the court, the tax lien shall be declared otherwise. appear after the assessment will not affect until a certain event is determined to occur. Conversely, there is no requirement that the IRS assess taxes in order for taxes to be considered legitimate legal claims in bankruptcy (ie, in the absence of tax lien securing taxes, non-classified taxes can be classified as unsafe priority claims legitimate under 11 USC Ã, §, 507 or a valid, non-public safe claim, as applicable).
The argument that a person is not required to file tax returns or pay taxes unless the Internal Revenue Service responds to the person's questions, etc., and variations of this argument have been formally identified as officially frivolous Federal tax returns for the purpose of a tax refund fine for $ 5,000 taxed under Internal Revenue Code section 6702 (a).
Implementing the rules
Another argument made by taxpayers is that certain sections of the law (that is, certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code) must be supported by implementing regulations for certain sections in order for that section to be legally valid, or that the lack of implementing regulations for that part make it has no legal power. This argument is uniformly rejected by the court.
The argument that the acquittal in a criminal tax case proves no law imposing a tax obligation
One of the taxpayers' arguments is that the release of a defendant in a Federal criminal tax case proves that no law imposes a Federal tax liability tax, or that the exemption frees the defendant from liability for Federal income tax. No court has accepted this argument.
One well-known example of the ongoing tax issue for the acquitted defendant is the case of Vernice Kuglin, who was released in a 2003 criminal proceeding on federal income tax evasion charges. Kuglin's tax issue was not negated by his release, and in 2004 he entered into a settlement with the government in which he agreed to pay more than $ 500,000 in taxes and fines. On April 30, 2007, the Memphis Daily News reported that the Kuglin tax problem continued with the filing of the Federal Tax Lien Notice against its assets of $ 188,025. The Memphis newspaper also stated that Kuglin had "relinquished his fight against tax payments, according to Sept. 10, 2004, the Commercial Appeal story."
The argument about the taxable amount
Some protesters argue that taxes should be based on amounts other than the amount of money or fair market value of the property or service received.
Value of gold or silver coins
Some people argue that with respect to the receipt of gold or silver coins, the taxpayer only needs to report as "nominal" earnings, and not actual actual market value higher than coins. In the case of Joslin , the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that under 26 U.S.C.Ã, Ã, §§ 61 and 26 C.F.R. 1.61-2 (d) (1), taxpayers who bid to be paid for services in a legitimate tender (in this case, silver dollar coins) must report income at fair market value (numismatic value), and not on face value low. Similarly, in the case of Cordner , the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a taxpayer who receives Double Eagle's gold coins as a distribution of the company must report as fair market value earnings of the coins, not more nominal value low. In this case, where the coin, for reasons of value to the collector or by reason of the intrinsic value of its content, has a fair market value exceeding its nominal value, it is treated as a "property other than money" for the purpose. from 26 USCÃ,§ 301, generating tax at fair market value.
The Ninth Circuit Court has ruled that under 26 U.S.C.Ã, 1001, in the exchange of Swiss francs for US Dual Eagle gold coins, taxpayers are taxed at aggregate fair market value, and not a lower nominal value. In this case, taxpayers and governments argue over whether Double Eagle coins are a valid means of payment. The court stated that they did not have to decide the matter. The court stated: "Since the key element is the excess market value of the nominal value, it is not material that the coin can be a legal instrument of payment at face value."
In other cases, the taxpayer argument - that gold and silver coins must, for Federal tax purposes, be valued at face value, while foreign coins, in general, should be judged according to their precious metal content - are rejected. The Court states: "Coins that are not currently circulated as a means of payment are property which is valued at fair market value for the purposes of section 1001 (b)... This result is not affected by the fact that the coin can still be used as legal, gentle at face value. "
Taxpayers have tried to argue that the Cordner Doctrine (see above) may not apply where the coins remain outstanding, because the coins in the Cordner box (gold coins ) has been used. withdrawn from circulation. This argument has been rejected. In the case of Stoecklin, the court ruled that taxpayers receiving coins (in this case, silver dollar coins) as compensation for services are taxed at fair market value of coins, not lower nominal value. , terle
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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